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Abstract 
 
This paper discusses the link between political accountability, regarded as an important aspect 
of institutional design, and infrastructure regulation that has been emphasized in the recent 
literature on the role of institutions in economic development. We report on the findings and 
lessons drawn from an analysis of telecommunications data covering the period 1985-1999 on 
two sets of countries; one composed of 29 developing countries and another of 23 developed 
countries. The main point highlighted by the analysis is that infrastructure regulation in a given 
country cannot be independent of the institutional environment, in particular, the degree of 
political accountability that supports the country’s institutions. The argument is demonstrated 
by means of an econometric estimation of dynamic panel data models that shows evidence of a 
significant effect of pro- political accountability factors on regulatory performance as reflected 
in measures of sector output and efficiency. Expectedly enough, this effect is found to be more 
pronounced in the developing countries data set. A key policy implication of this result is that 
efforts to enhance institutional quality and support politically accountable systems in 
developing countries should yield large benefits for infrastructure regulation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
During the last two decades a worldwide wave of economic reforms has significantly affected the 
organizational and institutional landscape of infrastructure sectors including telecommunications, 
electricity, water, and the like. In developed countries, the main purpose of the reforms has been to 
enhance the efficiency of these sectors traditionally organized as vertically integrated monopolies. 
The policy objective in these coutries has then been to redesign the legal and regulatory framework 
so as to induce "proper" economic incentives, namely, incentives for operators in the infrastructure 
sectors to improve their cost efficiency, quality of service, and tariffs. 
 
While the reforms conducted in developing countries follow the same principles, they differed in 
their implementation in at least two respects. First, even though there was clearly room for 
improving the performance of infrastructure sectors in developed countries, the availability of 
service didn’t pose a fundamental problem. In contrast, in developing countries service was 
sometimes merely non existent and, in the case of telecommunications, networks were not developed 
in large parts of the rural areas. Second, institutional design in developing countries was far more 
challenging than in developed countries. Developed countries typically needed to modernize an 
existing social and institutional fabric with a complex system of operating rules built over a long 
history of political and economic administration of market economies. This crucial experience was 
just lacking in developing countries. Beyond the fact that these countries with poor human capital 
endowments had to follow the industrialized world in the setting of totally new institutions, they had 
to reform their old inadequate administrative functioning rules.  
 
After a period of implementation of policies of liberalization and privatization of some segments 
coupled with the creation of regulatory authorities, large efforts have been allocated to improve the 
efficiency of these authorities. Independence of regulatory authorities, capacity of their human 
resources, and quality of regulatory governance in the sector are the three policy items that have 
mobilized much of these efforts. On the research front, however, both theoretical work on the 
optimal design of regulatory institutions and empirical work on the measurement of regulatory 
institutions' performance suggest that these specific items should not be considered independently 
from factors related to the governance of the economy as a whole. This paper is concerned with the 
relative weight of these sector-specific and economy-wide determinants of the performance of 
infratrsucture regualtion. This paper reports on an investigation of this issue for the case of  
telecommunications by means of an econometric analysis of two data sets, one on developing 
countries and another on developed countries. 
 
The determinants of regulatory performance have been discussed both in the theoretical and 
empirical streams of the literature on infrastructure industries regulation. We distinguish two 
approaches. A first approach, which is conceptual in nature and inspired by political science, argues 
that when thinking about regulatory performance the relevant game is the one that takes place 
upstream at the (higher) level of politics (Spiller and Tommasi, 2005). Another more empirical 
approach emphasizes the impact of regulatory governance on performance (Cubbin and Stern, 
2005b). Our general view is that the relationship between political and regulatory structures and 
processes has to be given due attention when assessing regulatory performance. Hence, our study is 
an attempt to merge both of these approaches in order to feed in some empirical elements to the 
debate on the relationship between political and regulatory institutions that so far has mainly taken 
place at a conceptual level. 
 
The empirical strategy adopted is based on a set of econometric regressions with a special attention 
given to variables that give some indications on the "degree" of political accountability that 
characterize the economic institutions of a country. How politically accountable is an economic 
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system depends on the existence and the degree of implementability of "..a proactive process by 
which public officials inform about and justify their plans of action, their behavior and results, and 
are sanctioned accordingly." (Ackerman, 2005) We consider political accountability as fundamental 
in the exercise of the link between political structures and regulatory processes and hence view its 
(political-game) equilibrium level as an important determinant of the regulatory process' 
performance. This leads up to test in our data the hypothesis that, all things equal, "more" political 
accountability should enhance the performance of infrastructure regulation. A further conjecture that 
the empirical analysis allows us to test is that this hypothesis dinds stronger support in the data on 
developing countries.1 
 
This paper is organized as follows. The next section decribes some theoretical and empirical 
arguments developed in the recent literatures on the design of institutions and on the evaluation of 
regulatory performance in infrastructure sectors. This section is by no means an exhaustive survey 
but its goal is to show that there is a need to merge these two streams of the literature on regulatory 
institutions. Section 3 is devoted to a description of the data and a discussion of their general 
properties. Section 4 discusses the findings of our empirical analysis of the relationship between 
political accountability and the performance of infrastructure regulation. Section 5 summarizes the 
empirical results and discusses some policy implications. The appendix gives some standard 
summary statistics of the data.   
 
2. Institutions and regulatory design and outcomes - What do we know?  
 
Recent contributions to the theory of the design of institutions and empirical work concerned with 
the measurement of their performance have brought to daylight the issue of the evaluation of the 
performance of regulation. Laffont (2005) provides some edifying thoughts on the design of 
regulatory institutions in developing countries.  
 
Two approaches have been followed to examine the determinants of regulatory performance and 
outcomes. A first approach is conceptual and analyzes the role of political structures and processes. 
A second approach, more empirical, emphasizes the impact of the quality of regulatory governance. 
We briefly review the main arguments developed by these two approaches and point to the need to 
develop a unified analytical framework. This paper is an empirical effort in this direction. 
 
The first approach analyzes the relationship between political structures and processes and the 
conduct of regulation by emphasizing the need to open the black box of the organization and 
functioning of governments (Estache and Martimort, 1999, North, 2000).2 In their analysis of the link 
between politics and regulation in the US, McCubbins et al. (1987) argue that, by reducing the costs 
of monitoring and by sharpening sanctions, administrative procedures can give rise to an equilibrium 
in which compliance with the preferences of political agents is greater than it otherwise would be.3 
This relationship is further explored by Levy and Spiller (1994) in the telecommunications sector 
through an analysis of case studies. In particular, they evaluate the potential for political agents to 
manipulate the regulatory process. They find that sector performance can be satisfactory under a 
wide range of regulatory procedures as long as arbitrary administrative decisions can be restrained. 
                                        
1From a normative perspective, since a better regulatory performance is expected to improve social welfare, this would 
suggest that marginal social benefit of political accountability is higher in developing countries. 
2By emphasizing the political game, this approach fits in the New Institutional Economics paradigm that takes its 
foundations in the precepts of transaction cost theory and positive political economy. This paradigm constitutes an 
important departure from the standard normative approach to public economics. 
3Bottom-up "fire-alarm" monitoring through external agents affected by regulatory policies is a good example of a 
method that can reduce the informational costs of following the activities of agencies (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984). 
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The link between the political and regulatory spheres is further analyzed in Spiller and Tommasi 
(2005) through the impact that the characteristics of political environments have on the ability of 
political agents to reach intertemporal cooperation. They argue that long-term political cooperation is 
likely to lead to stable and flexible regulatory policies, hence, to effective regulation. This is 
particularly true when the agents with decision power have strong intertemporal relationships, policy 
and political moves are widely observable, good enforcement technologies are available, and the 
short-run payoffs from noncooperation are not so high. They further argue that less efficient 
regulatory rules resulting from a rigid regulatory context may in fact provide incentives for 
investment whereas granting discretion to the regulator may lead to arbitrary outcomes if 
institutional endowments are low. 
 
Heller and McCubbins (1996) argue that incentives for investing in infrastructure industries are not 
credible within a given regulatory structure unless there is a political context that makes them 
sustainable. Regulatory predictability is a key feature for gaining credibility and political institutions 
play an important role in enhancing this predictability. The higher the quality of the political and 
institutional environment, the harder it is to change regulatory structures and procedures. In 
particular, the more veto political players with effective authority there are, the easier it is to block 
policy change. The main argument of this line of policy research is that the more established political 
structures and processes, the higher the cost of institutional change, and the more efficient the 
conduct of regulation. 
 
Let us now briefly review the empirical approach that emphasizes the role of regulatory governance. 
The fundamental belief that motivates much of this line of research that essentially deals with 
infrastructure industries is that good regulatory governance is a prerequisite to a proper functioning 
of the positive relationship between regulatory incentives and regulatory performance. This belief is 
based on the conjecture that "...regulatory agencies with better governance should make fewer 
mistakes, have their mistakes identified and rectified better and more quickly, so that good regulatory 
practice is more readily established and maintained." (Cubbin and Stern, 2000a). 
 
The basic empirical implications of these hypotheses is that, thanks to the structuring and the practice 
of regulation it entails, e.g., as an independent regulator making transparent regulatory decisions, 
better regulatory governance increases supply capacity and enhances productive and allocative 
efficiency. In the case of telecommunications, these implications are typically tested in data collected 
on a set of developing countries observed during a given time period. Regulatory performance is 
measured by mainline penetration rates and/or mainlines per employee, and regulatory governance is 
captured in an index that aggregates a set of aspects related to the structuration and internal 
organization of regulation (Gutierrez, 2003a).4 Overall, when applied to telecommunications 
(Gutierrez, 2003b) and electricity (Cubbin and Stern, 2005a), the methodology yields a positive 
impact of regulatory governance on such regulatory output measures. For a survey of empirical 
studies on regulatory governance and performance in developing countries, see Cubin and Stern 
(2005b). 
 
A typical contribution to this line of research starts from the global conceptual view that 
"…institutional quality is the dominant determinant of variations in long-term growth performance." 
(See Cubbin and Stern, 2005a and the citations thereof) However, in its implementation part, often it 
                                        
4These studies and ours use "outcome variables" to measure regulatory performance.  A more rigorous assessment of 
regulatory performance entails conducting surveys to capture the quality of regulators’ decisions which ultimately impact 
sector outcomes (see, e.g., Correa et al, 2008 and Brown et al, 2006). Such surveys do not exist but would definitely, if 
undertaken, provide a better indication of the performance of regulation in infrastructure industries. 
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only accounts for micro dimensions of institutional quality embodied in what is referred to as the 
quality of regulatory governance. Our view is that this approach should substantially gain in richness 
by drawing lessons from the literature on the design of institutions discussed earlier in this section. 
We take a step towards a unified approach that, when evaluating regulatory performance, in addition 
to specifying variables of regulatory governance, explicitly incorporates variables linking political 
and regulatory structures and processes. In our analysis, the variables through which the interface 
between political and regulatory structures and processes is going to materialize are variables that are 
used to proxy the concept of political accountability as described in the introduction. 
 
A key idea on which this approach rests is that limiting the use and sanctioning the abuse of political 
power should help disentangling regulatory processes from the opportunistic behavior of political 
agents.5 The elections mechanism should, in principle, ensure political accountability since citizens 
select representatives who hold bureaucrats and members of the judiciary system accountable for 
their behavior. However, this property of elections is hard to satisfy since the electoral process 
suffers from important information asymmetries between elected politicians and citizens and lack of 
politicians ex post accountability. Privatization of government monopolies, liberalization, and the 
application of private management principles to state-owned entreprises, have proven to be policies 
that improve political agents' accountability in a much more targeted way. However, when analyzing 
regulatory performance, beyond giving full consideration to such pro-accountability reforms as the 
above "marketization" policies, to the independence of the regulator, and to other factors related to 
the sector's regulatory governance, we think that it is also important to give due attention to other 
pro-accountability factors that are related to the governance of the economy as a whole. 
Implementing this thought is at the heart of our empirical study to which we now turn. 
 
3. Data on regulatory outcomes and institutional environment 
 
This section gives a broad description of the data used in this study and discusses some of their 
general properties. We have constructed two data sets both covering the period 1985-1999, one on 
developing countries and another on developed countries.6 The countries included in the data set on 
developing countries are India, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Kenya, 
Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, South Africa, Jordan, Morocco, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Panama, 
Peru, El Salvador, and Venezuela. Those included in the data set on developed countries are 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. For each of these countries, we have collected 
information on variables regrouped into the four categories "Regulatory performance," "Local 
accountability," "Global accountability," and "Other variables." Table 1 below gives the list of these 
variables along with their designation. For a precise definition of these variables and the data 
sources, see Gasmi et al. (2006). 
 
As indicated above, regulatory performance is measured by the level of output (mainline penetration 
or cellular subscription), efficiency (mainlines per employee), or price (fixed residential, cellular).7 
In view of the conceptual framework discussed in the previous section, we have regrouped variables 
that inform us on the existence of political accountability into variables of "local" and "global" 
                                        
5As noted by Spiller and Tommasi (2005), opportunistic behavior of politicians can be expected in infrastructure 
industries because of the important economic stakes involved. 
6For reasons discussed in the introduction, these two data sets have been subject to separate estimation though to 
comparative result analysis.   
7These outcome variables are indirect measures of regulatory performance based on objective data on regulated firms as 
opposed to direct measures based on subjective data reported by surveyed regulatory agencies. 
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accountability meant to represent the quality of, respectively, regulatory governance in the sector and 
political governance at the level of the whole economy. Therefore, local accountability is captured in 
variables reflecting the degree of political and financial independence of the regulator, the level of 
transparency of accounts and regulatory decisions, the clarity of the allocation of responsibilities 
among institutions, the nature of the legal environment, and the degree of social participation in 
regulatory decisions.8 As to global accountability, it is captured in variables reflecting the quality of 
the institutional framework (government integrity, efficiency of bureaucracy, strength of courts and 
enforcement capacity, government commitment capacity, and currency risk) and the quality of the 
political process (strength of checks and balances).9 
 
Table 1 
Variables and designation  
Variable Designation 
Regulatory performance 
ml  Mainline penetration  
cel  Cellular subscription  
eff  Mainlines per employee  
_p res  Monthly subscription to fixed  
_p cel  Price of cellular  
Local accountability 
reg Regulatory governance index  
Global accountability 
corruption Corruption  
bureau  Bureaucracy  
law Law and order  
expropri  Expropriation  
currency Currency risk  
institutional Institutional environment index  
checks Checks and balances  
Other variables  
priva Privatization  
comp_fix Competition in fixed  
comp_cel Competition in cellular  
rural Rural population  
density Population density  
 
The variables in the group of other variables are introduced to control for some effects deemed 
important when estimating the relationship between political accountability and regulatory 
performance. Given that the telecommunications sector has undergone significant market structure 
changes during the period under study, we have included some reform variables that inform on the 
privatization of the incumbent and the introduction of competition in fixed and cellular service as the 
                                        
8Our study contributes then to the literature on the impact of the infrastructure industries reforms by extending the set of 
variables capturing regulatory governance. In that respect, it stands along the line of Gutierrez (2003b) and Holder and 
Stern (1999) who have constructed detailed indices of regulators' characteristics in Latin American countries for the 
telecom sector, and in Asian countries for the electricity sector, respectively. The importance of these dimensions for 
regulatory agencies to be sustainable has been emphasized (Estache and Martimort, 1999). In our data samples, in 26 of 
the 29 developing countries and 21 of the 23 developed countries, the regulator has become independent at some point 
during the period under study. 
9Both the empirical and theoretical literatures suggest that it is not so much the extent of democracy that is relevant to 
investors but rather the ability of the government to credibly commit to a policy regime. The level of policy stability is 
captured here through an index that indicates whether there exists an "effective" number of checks and balances. 
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liberalization of these segments has arguably had different market implications (Gasmi and Recuero 
Virto, 2006). During the period spanned by our samples both developing and developed countries 
countries have been extensively engaged in reforms of their telecommunications industries formerly 
organized as state monopolies. In our data set on 29 developing countries, 18 of these countries have 
partially privatized their historical operator, 14 have introduced competition in the local fixed-line 
segment, and 24 have introduced competition in the cellular segment. In our data set on 23 developed 
countries, these figures are respectively 20, 10, and 15. In both types of countries, the reforms have 
coincided with the introduction of new technologies that have significantly reduced costs and 
increased demand. We have also included in this group of control variables some country-specific 
demand features that inform us on the population (density) and its distribution (urban vs rural).  
 
Table 2 below provides the correlation coefficients between the variables representing regulatory 
performance and those representing political accountability.10 We see from this table that the 
correlation between the variables of regulatory performance and political accountability is generally 
stronger for developing countries than for developed countries. This is particularly so when 
regulatory performance is measured by mainline penetration, cellular subscription, or mainlines per 
employee, and political accountability is captured by the strength of checks and balances. The same 
is true when regulatory performance is measured by mainlines per employee and political 
accountability is captured by the regulatory governance index, and when regulatory performance is 
measured by cellular subscription or price of cellular and political accountability is captured by the 
quality of the institutional environment. We also note that, in both samples, the regulatory 
performance variables tend to correlate relatively "more"' with the variables that reflect the quality of 
the broad institutional environment than those that reflect the quality of regulatory governance in the 
sector. 
 
Table 2 
Correlation coefficients  
(developing countries,developed countries) 
  Regulatory performance 
  ml  cel  ef f p_res p_cel 
Global accountability  institutional (0.41,0.63) (0.65,0.24) (0.42,0.22) (0.23,0.28) (0.60,0.01 
 checks (0.34,0.07) (0.39,0.04) (0.36,0.01) (-0.01,0.12)  (0.30,0.24) 
Local accountability reg (0.19,0.43) (0.57,0.55) (0.30,0.05) (-0.06,0.01) (0.61,-0.07) 
 
Note: In any entry (a,b) of the table, a concerns the developing countries and b the developed countries. 
 
It is instructive to examine the evolution of these variables over the period spanned by the samples. 
When measured by mainline penetration, cellular subscription, or mainlines per employee, regulatory 
performance has, on average, increased twice as much in developing countries than in developed 
countries. This relatively higher increase of output in developing countries most likely reflects the 
fact that unmet demand was considerably more important in these countries in the early part of 
period. In contrast, when measured by the monthly subscription to the fixed service, which has 
increased in both developing and developed countries, or the price of cellular, which has decreased, 
regulatory performance has improved noticeably more in developed countries. This conclusion 
should be moderated though. First, the significantly higher increase of the monthly subscription to 
the fixed telephone service in developing countries might be due to the fact that policies of tariff re-
balancing have been relatively more intense in these countries. Second, the significantly lower 
decrease of price of cellular in developing countries might reflect a relatively less mature and hence 
less effective competition in this segment of the market than in developed countries. 
 
                                        
10Table A1 in the appendix provides some summary statistics of the data on the developing and developed countries.  
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To conclude this brief check up of the data, we should mention that we find that the quality of the 
institutional environment and the political process has shown a relatively higher improvement in 
developing countries during the period under study. But again, this observation should be taken with 
care at this point as it might only reflect the fact that these countries were considerably lagging 
behind on these two dimensions. 
 
4. Does political accountability affect regulatory performance? 
 
As indicated above, our investigation of the effect of political accountability relies on a set of 
regressions.11 While the estimation of the coefficients of these regressions allows us to assess the 
(quantitative) impact of the political accountability variables on the regulatory performance 
variables, asking first whether there exists a causal relationship between these variables will allow us 
to meaningfully interpret this impact. We therefore performed some causality tests.12 Table 3 below 
summarizes our findings on the existence of causal relationships in the two data sets analyzed.  
 
It is fair to say that, overall, the results support the proposition that in both developing and developed 
countries there exists a causal relationship between political accountability and regulatory 
performance. This is particularly true when we examine political accountability through the quality 
of the institutional environment. Another interesting feature of the results is that global 
accountability variables seem to be in a stronger causal relationship with regulatory performance 
than local accountability variables, and this is even more so in developing countries. Even though the 
empirical evidence of such relationships is admittedly stronger in the data on developing countries, 
we feel that the importance of the issue from a policy point of view warrants a careful analysis of the 
quantitative aspects of these relationships, a task which is taken up next. 
 
Table 3 
(Granger -) Causality relationships  
(developing countries,developed countries)   
     Variable   Local accountability Global accountability  
 reg institutional  checks  
ml  (Yes,No) (Yes,Yes)  Yes,No) 
cel    (No,Yes) (Yes,Yes) (Yes,Yes) 
eff    (No,No) (Yes,No) (No,No) 
_p res    (Yes,Yes) (Yes,Yes) (Yes,No) 
_p cel    (Yes,No) (Yes,No) (No,No) 
Notes: 
-In any entry (a,b) of this table, a concerns the developing countries and b the developed countries. 
-A "Yes" ("No") indicates that evidence of a causal relationship running from the accountability 
variable to the regulatory performance variable has (has not) been found. 
 
The preliminary analysis of the data performed so far sets the ground for a scrutiny of the 
relationship between political accountability and regulatory performance in the two data sets. In 
                                        
11Our empirical investigation of the impact of political accountability on regulatory performance relies on a series of 
regressions in which the dependent variable is one that measures regulatory performance and the independent variables 
that retain much of our attention are those that are used to capture political accountability. We apply the Differenced 
Generalized Method of Moments (DIF-GMM) method  developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) for analyzing panel data 
and applied by Beck and Katz (2004) to Time Series Cross-Sectional data. A technical issue that we addressed prior to 
estimation is that of stationarity of the dependent variable. To address stationarity, we followed a method sugested by 
Blundell and Bond (1998, 1999). See also Arellano and Bover (1995). 
12These tests combine the DIF-GMM estimation technique with a Granger-causality testing procedure developed in 
Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) for panel data.  
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addition to bringing empirical evidence on the causal relationship between political accountability 
and regulatory performance, the Granger-causality tests provided us with information on the 
dynamic structure of this relationship. The end-product of this testing procedure is a list of potential 
variables to be included as regressors when estimating the quantitative impact of political 
accountability on regulatory performance. In order to minimize the risk of estimation inaccuracy, a 
serious threat in the context of dynamic data analysis which is ours, we made sure that, if needed, the 
variables used to measure regulatory performance, the dependent variables, were transformed so as 
to make them stationary. The next step was to run DIF-GMM regressions using political 
accountability regressors drawn from the set of variables that have "passed" the causality test and for 
both the developing countries and developed data panesl.  
 
Concerning the developing countries data, we find that, for any of the five variables used to measure 
regulatory performance, there is at least one variable used to represent political accountability that 
significantly affects it. Except when regulatory performance is measured by the monthly subscription 
to fixed, the sign of this impact is as expected, i.e., the higher the political accountability, the better 
the regulatory performance as reflected in higher output (increase in mainline penetration and 
cellular subscription), higher efficiency (increase in mainlines per employee), and lower prices 
(decrease in price of cellular).  
 
The apparently counterintuitive case where we find that higher political accountability (less risk of 
expropriation for operators and stronger checks and balances) leads to a higher monthly subscription 
to fixed service might in fact only reflect the extent of tariff rebalancing that typically takes place in 
developing countries during the early stages of the reforms. When we distinguish local accountability 
(regulatory governance) from global accountability, it is interesting to note that the latter is more 
often found to have a significant impact on regulatory performance. Nevertheless, in the cases when 
it is found to be significant, the effect of regulatory governance on regulatory performance has the 
expected sign, namely, a better regulatory governance leads to a higher output and a lower price. 
 
The results obtained with the data on the developed countries convey quite different messages and 
are generally poor compared with those obtained with the data set on the developing countries. In 
fact, some reasonable regressions could only be found when using either mainline penetration, 
cellular subscription, or monthly subscription to fixed to measure regulatory performance. As to the 
impact of political accountability on regulatory performance, the only sensible results that could be 
recovered from the data on developed countries are a positive effect of regulatory governance and 
checks and balances on cellular subscription and a monthly subscription to the fixed service that 
decreases when the currency risk to operators diminishes. 
 
In both data sets, the time-specific effects are highly significant suggesting that attention should be 
given to important political and economic events in a given country when examining the 
performance of regulation. We also find that the reform variables are endogenous in all the 
regressions except when regulatory performance was measured by cellular subscription and by the 
monthly subscription to fixed in the data set on developing countries, and by the monthly 
subscription to fixed in the data set on developed countries. These results are consistent with the idea 
that reforms are increasingly performance-based.13 
 
These findings suggest that, overall, there are reasons to believe that local accountability, 
synonymous in this paper to regulatory governance, generally affects regulatory performance in a 
significant way in developing as well as developed countries. The story is not so clear when it comes 
                                        
13Endogeneity of regulatory policies has been discussed in Gasmi and Recuero Virto (2006), Gutierrez (2003), and Ros 
(1999, 2003). 
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to global accountability. In the data set on developing countries, we found that the quality of the 
political process and the institutional environment have a favorable impact on regulatory 
performance when the latter is evaluated by the level of output, price, or efficiency in the 
telecommunications industry. In contrast, in the data set on developed countries, while the quality of 
the political process has been found to have a positive impact on regulatory performance when the 
latter is measured by achieved output, the institutional environment showed an ambiguous impact 
when regulatory performance is measured by output and prices.  
 
Table 4 below summarizes our findings. In this table, the signs "+" and "-" respectively indicate a 
positive and a negative impact of the political accountability variable indicated in the column on the 
regulatory performance variable indicated in the row. The variable institutional which is an index 
reflecting the quality of the institutional environment, is constructed by aggregating five indices 
reflecting the extent of corruption in the country (corruption), the burden of the bureaucracy 
(bureau), the strength of the judicial system and the degree of observance of the law (law), the risk of 
expropriation through outright asset confiscation or imposed nationalization (expropri), and the risk 
of losses to operators due to exchange rate fluctuations (currency).  
 
Table 4 
Impact of political accountability on regulatory performance  
(developing countries,developed countries)   
     Variable   Local accountability Global accountability  
 reg institutional  checks  
ml  (+ ,NA) (NS,− ) (+ ,NA) 
cel    (NA,+ ) (+ ,NS) (+ ,+ ) 
eff    (NA,NA) (+ ,NA) (NA,NA) 
_p res    (− ,NS) (+ ,− )  (+ ,NA) 
_p cel   (− ,NA) (− ,NA)  (NA,NA) 
Notes: 
-In any entry (a,b) of this table, a concerns the developing countries and b the developed countries. 
-A "+" ("-") indicates that a positive (negative) and significant effect was found. 
-"NS" indicates that no significant effect was found  and "NA" stands for "not applicable." 
 
5. Conclusions and lessons for regulators  
 
The quality of political institutions has long been emphasized in both the academic and the 
institutional spheres as being a crucial determinant of economic performance. This paper has 
illustrated an approach that draws lessons from the recent conceptual literature concerned with the 
role of the economy-wide governance in the shaping of regulatory outcomes and feed them into the 
more empirical approach that directly examines the impact of sector-wide governance on regulatory 
performance. This "integrated" approach rests on the idea that political accountability is a key factor 
in the interface between political and regulatory structures. This approach is illustrated for the case of 
telecommunications in developing and developed countries by analyzing the impact of political 
accountability variables on regulatory outcome variables in two time-series-cross-sectional data sets. 
 
Two sets of variables are used to capture political accountability: local accountability variables and 
global accountability variables. Local accountability variables include most of the features related to 
"regulatory governance," namely, unbundling of regulation from policy making, autonomy and 
independence of the regulator, accountability of the regulator, clarity in the allocation of mandates 
and attributes among government institutions, legal aspects, transparency of regulatory practices, and 
participation in the regulatory process. These variables are synthesized in a regulatory governance 
index. Global accountability variables include variables concerning corruption, bureaucracy, law and 
order, expropriation, currency risk, and checks and balances.  
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Using a data sample on developing countries and another on developed countries, the study measures 
the impact of these political accountability variables on some outcome variables variables meant to 
measure regulatory performance, namely, mainline penetration, cellular subscription, mainlines per 
employee, monthly subscription to the fixed, or price of cellular. The analysis has shown a relatively 
weak effect of political accountability on the performance of regulation in developed countries and a 
much more clear-cutting effect in the case of developing countries, namely, higher political 
accountability yields higher regulatory performance. What implications can one derive from such a 
finding for the telecommunications industry and to some extent for most of the infrastructure 
industries?14 
 
During the last two decades, many developing countries have created regulatory agencies mostly 
relying on advice provided by international financial institutions and international lawyers to 
implement these regulatory models. New regulatory institutions were however not tailored or 
customized enough to fit the local cultural, political and social endowments. The study described in 
this paper again stresses this very important requirement for success in developing new institutions. 
Furthermore, the study goes beyond most current analyses in the area by extending the focus of the 
analysis to what has been referred to as issues of global accountability which reflect the quality of 
political institutions. 
 
Recent contributions have deepened the understanding of regulatory effectiveness along two 
dimensions. The first dimension is regulatory governance, a concept which is a bit broader than what 
the concept of local accountability discussed here encompasses. The second is regulatory substance, 
a concept which is meant to capture the way regulation is actually performed. Brown et al. (2006) 
have proposed a comprehensive evaluation process of the effectiveness of regulatory institutions. If 
implemented, this process will highlight not only the structural weaknesses but also the deficiencies 
stemming from the surrounding environment of regulation, in particular, the political environment. 
 
It is thus important to devise policy mitigation instruments that incorporate both of these dimensions. 
Unfortunately, common practices during the last decade or so have shown that donors' interventions 
are centered on structural issues. The analysis described in this paper clearly advocates for the 
definition of a set of instruments of effective intervention with the objective of achieving political 
accountability improvements in the practice of infrastructure regulation. Indeed, building regulatory 
institutions in developing countries should be part of a broader strategy of "good governance" and 
not only be considered, as it has been in the past years, as a sectoral matter. The empirical analysis 
reported in this paper has shown that the stake of such a broadening of the view of how regulatory 
institutions should be built in developing countries is important indeed. 
 
Building regulatory institutions in developing countries has proven to be more complex than initially 
thought. The paper has argued that regulatory governance is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for good regulatory performance. Political accountability matters for the way regulatory 
institutions operate and make decision. Deepening the understanding of these inter-relationships calls 
for a better assessment of the political economy of infrastructure reforms as well as it entails proper 
analysis and understanding of how political systems work. This calls for a greater integration of work 
undertaken by economists and political scientists in the design of regulatory institutions. But, and 
after all, we need to keep in mind that building new institutions requires time. Regulatory institutions 
in developing countries still need to be supported. For development partners, this means a greater 
concentration of their efforts on countries where preconditions for success are relatively tangible. 
                                        
14The results found for the telecommunications sector can be expected to hold in other infrastructures although this study 
calls for a careful account for the technological specificities of the other sectors. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 
Data summary statistics 
(developing countries,developed countries) 
Variable Designation Obs. Median Std. Dev Min. Max. 
REGULATORY PERFORMANCE      
ml  Mainline penetration (435,345) (3.76,47.49) (4.96,10.87) (0.11,14.52) (22.36,73.56) 
cel  Cellular subscription (431,344) (0.01,2.55) (2.09,13.51) (0,0) (15.96,63.37) 
eff  Mainlines per employee (424,345) (53.06,166.08) (58.85,57.53) (7.78,43.48) (371.16,358.76)
_p res Monthly subscription to fixed (256,252) (4.44,4.70) (4.23,4.70) (0,5.60) (21.29,26.27) 
_p cel  Price of cellular (324,192) (0,1.40) (0.53,0.86) (0,0) (2.24,4.95) 
LOCAL ACCOUNTABILITY      
reg Regulatory governance index (435,345) (0,0) (4.60,3.11) (0,0) (13.5,8) 
GLOBAL ACCOUNTABILITY      
corruption Corruption (435,345) (5,8.33) (1.43,1.37) (1.66,3.33) (10,10) 
bureau  Bureaucracy (420,345) (5,10) (1.86,1.33) (1.66,4.5) (10,10) 
law  Law and order (435,345) (5,10) (2.06,1.11) (0,5) (10,10) 
expropri Expropriation (420,345) (7.35,10) (2.00,0.66) (2,4.6) (10,10) 
currency Currency risk (435,345) (6,9) (1.98,1.16) (1,4) (10,10) 
institutional  Institutional environment index (435,345) (28.66,47) (7.10,3.99) (8,25.26) (41.16,50) 
checks  Checks and balances (423,345) (3,4) (2.06,1.62) (1,2) (18,16) 
OTHER VARIABLES      
priva Privatization (435,345) (0,0) (0.32,0.48) (0,0) (1,1) 
_comp fix  Competition in fixed (435,345) (0,0) (0.29,0.42) (0,0) (1,1) 
_comp cel  Competition in cellular (435,345) (1,0) (1.10,0.47) (0,0) (3,1) 
rural  Rural population (435,345) (49.82,24.70) (20.95,12.73) (10.95,2.95) (90.31,62.84) 
density  Population density (435,345) (48.07,94.59) (79.39,119.50) (5.38,2.01) (330.34,466.49)
Note: In any entry (a,b) of the table, a concerns the developing countries and b the developed countries.
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